http://instagr.am/p/LL6s28KmO7/

http://instagr.am/p/LL6igTKmOz/

Charles Galloway

May 11, 2012

Conclusion

The Palestinian water policies fail to ensure equitable use of water, sustainable management, or the development of water resources. Although the policies have some merit when analyzed on the basis of policy development, the outcomes of the policy fall far short. The main impediment to the policy is the fact that Palestine maintains the responsibility to do all the actions in order to ensure the written goals are met, however they do not have the authority to generate(?) their desired outcomes on their landholdings(?) . This impediment is primarily due to the economic, industrial, and military inferiority that they have vis a vis (or “with respect to”) Israel. Because of these shortcomings, the Palestinian policy should have been written with recognition of their lack of real authority in order to have a more reasonable outlook, although that would defeat many of their future political and international goals. Although the objective that sought to come to international and regional agreements of equitable water use and distribution was written, the focus of the policy should have been more on this objective, in order to bring about real policy change by way of international pressure on Israel. Although the policy sought to provide quality, quantity, and infrastructure to Palestine has not seen enough gains to categorize success of the policy. This analysis shows that the Palestinian water policies are not successful according to the guidelines that they have established for the distribution of water to their population, and the management of those resources for the betterment of the public good.

 

References Cited

 

 

Al-Dadah, J.Y. 2000. Water Demand Management and Conservation Methods in Palestine. Palestinian Water Authority. Palestine 9 pp.

 

Baumgarten, P. A. 2009. Israel’s Transboundary Water Disputes. Pace Law School Student Publications. New York. 29 pp.

 

CIA. 2012. The CIA World Fact Book – West Bank.  Available at:

http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geo/we.html (accessed: 3/19/2012).

 

Kinarty N. and Nabil El-Sherif. 2001. Israel – Palestinian Joint Water Committee: Joint Declaration for Keeping the Water Infrastructure out of the Cycle of Violence. International Water Law Project.

 

Sabbah, W and Jad Isaac. 1995. Towards a Palestinian Water Policy. Applied Research Institute. Bethlehem, West Bank. 18 pp.

 

Spiro, O.T. 2011. Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation on Water Issues. The Knesset Research and Information Center. Israel. 17 pp.

 

UNEP Desk Study Team on the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 2002. Desk Study on the Environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. United Nations. 188 pp.

 

Palestinian Water Authority (PWA). 2002. Water Law No.3/2002. Palestinian National Authority. Palestine.

 

Al Juneidi, F. and J. Issac. 1999. Water Irrigation Management in the Palestinian West Banks. Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem. Jeruslam. pp.1

 

Palestinian Water Authority (PWA). 2010. Water Supply Report. Palestinian National Authority. West Bank. Table A.11,

 

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics[1]. 2003. Percent Distribution of Households in the Palestinian Territory by Household Assessment of Public Network Water Quality and Region. Palestinian National Authority. Available at: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/WaterResources/tab5.aspx (accessed: 4/21/2012).

 

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics[2]. 2003. Percent Distribution of Households in the Palestinian Territory by Household Assessment of Tanks Water Quality and Region, Palestinian National Authority. Available at: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/WaterResources/tab4.aspx (accessed: 4/21/2012).

 

 

 

Foreign aid from the United States, by way of economic incentive to concede to policy efforts of the U.S., changes the policy and governance of countries. This essay analyzes the effects of economic foreign aid to Egypt and how it specifically challenged markets, policy making, outcomes of conflict, and the continued support of Authoritarian regimes with military support.

 

 

 

The foreign aid policy of the United States’ allows the government to maintain international dominance by way of rent giving and incentive structuring, and likewise the Egyptian government’s decision-making process were shifted. The United States’ foreign aid policy especially in areas where capital is used is a tool of control, manipulates policies under the guise of support to a particular cause. The purpose of this essay is to show how monetary aid to Egypt, which is used as a model of foreign aid influences, has and can continue to change political movements and historical events. In these pages there will not be an argument in which to establish whether foreign aid is morally just, however the questions of effects and fruitful manipulation will be represented. Simply, this essay will answer whether it is in the best interest for the United States to continue in its policy. Three historical examples of how foreign aid to Egypt has changed their incentive structure will be presented alongside arguments showing how foreign aid could affect internal policy making. Utilizing a review of Mankiw’s economic principles and applying them to this particular situation, the essay will illuminate the argument further. In order to understand how the United States’ foreign aid policy affects political and social elements of Egyptian life, an understanding of the Camp David Accords, Egyptian involvement in Desert Storm, and finally the political strength of the military elite after the fall of the Mubarak presidency is in order.

The study of economics, which can begin to explain the reactions of society, namely the individual actors, can explain the witnessed responses of persons affected by political, social, and financial factors in a society. The United States’ foreign aid policy towards Egypt is “to foster economic and social development within Egypt and thereby to create the preconditions for a permanent peace; to foster a process of reconciliation and peace in the region through demonstration effect; and to contain Islamic fundamentalist and radical ideologies and promote moderation” (Ebeid 2009, 27), however the economic subsidies that foreign aid pays to authoritarian entities further strengthens those regimes, such as in Egypt, causing a more powerful reaction by their opposition, in the case of Egyptian politics, the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the rules to the study of economics is that “rational people think at the margin” (Mankiw 2009, 6), meaning that people will only move in efforts that they perceive to offer tangible rewards. With this principle of economics we can see how the application to people in a society demonstrates why people embrace Political Islam, which is a tool that groups like the Muslim Brotherhood use to fight against regimes like the Egyptian governments from 1928 to the present. For instance, if a community feels that the rewards of gaining political power by using Islam is greater than either not gaining power at all or not using Islam as a mobilizing force, then they will surely utilize it for their purposes. This also bleeds into another economics concept on an independent and small group level called “People respond to incentives” (Mankiw 2009, 7-8), where people will respond to a stimulus of protection or of reward in order to gain or maintain a better state. This shows why countries that produce oil, “rentier states” (Ross 2001, 332), have fewer political decent than those that do not. Simply put, the incentive to revolt against the Authoritarian rentier state is lower that the incentive to continue to benefit from their rule, although the individual may not agree with the government at all times. Egypt as a rentier of political and economic support, is similar in mechanisms of control in the state, however relies on its strategic importance in the region to illicit fund. In general, the use of economics to explain people’s movements and responses to social, political, and economical forces benefits the study of Political Islam by offering explanations to describe “rational” actors in the National systems.

The Camp David Accords were established to bring about peace between Israel and Egypt in 1978, finally being signed in 1979, in which the United States offered economic aid to both Israel and Egypt in return for economic and political allegiance, as well as peace between the two neighbors. The agreement has been criticized as political bribery; however the governments of Israel and Egypt have grown accustomed to the monetary flow of US Dollars, and have based their spending and policies on the funds. United States foreign aid to Egypt in 2010 totaled 1.5 Billion, with about 1.3 Billion going directly to Military aid and 250 million going to economic aid. According to Hanaa Ebeid of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo states “Egypt alone received annual Economic Support Funds (ESF) that amounted to more than Asia and the Near East combined, Israel excluded” (Ebeid 2009, 29). Considering the massive amount of capital flowing into the economic system of Egypt, one cannot simply bypass the effects as haphazard.

In the book Common Sense Economics, the authors give seven economic sources of progress in a nation (Gwartney et. Al 2010, 41). Economic aid distorts economic incentives and thus changes the structure of markets making them reliant on unsustainable means for growth. These type of markets, particularly in Egypt, aren’t competitive, as is one of the sources of growth, because the market has no specific competitive advantage. Additionally, these markets change the limits that the government can effect market regulation and the efficiency of capital, both of which are also progressive markers in economies. Although free trade is a policy of Egyptian politics, as well as low taxes, the population is preyed upon by global markets and rent seekers in the government structure. This process of rent seeking, the gaining of economic return for services that are not based on production, is one of the ways that Egypt has flourished despite relatively slow modern growth. The Egyptian government, and in the recent case the former government of Hosni Mubarak, have become dependant on the U.S foreign aid package to remain in a state of development. The increase of capital, whether internal or external, devalues the currency and also changes the incentive structure of the people. One of Mankiw’s principles is “People Respond to Incentives” (Mankiw 2009, 7-8), which explain how decisions are made within context of desires and perceived gain. Putting this into context within the framework of government policy, a government that receive economic incentive for some international action needs to rely less on the taxing and economic gain of the population, thus creating mechanisms in which they pay less heed to internal political pressures to change. Additionally, if the capital of international powers continue to flow, the impetus of political movements to adjust to their responsibilities decreases, causing a possible rise of authoritarian responsible however not accountable regimes to flourish. This is precisely what happened in Egypt after the Camp David Accords in 1979 (Ebeid 2009, 28).

One of Mankiw’s principles of economics is that “Markets Are Usually a Good Way to Organize Economic Activity” (Mankiw 2009, 7-8), and this is an example of Adam Smith’s notion of the “invisible hand” (Smith 1976, 339). In an economy where there is a large flow of money present, without the value added to society by the spending of some form of work, the invisible hand of the market can be taken over, or at least manipulated by the strong arm of the economic imperialist. In the case of Egypt, economic dependence created markets that had to be arbitrarily controlled by the very same system that placed them under dependence on foreign subsidies. Douglas North, an American Economist writes, “We must create incentives for people to invest in more efficient technology, increase their skills, and organize efficient markets. Such incentives are embodied in institutions” (North 2000, qtd. in World Development Report 2002). In Egypt, the lack of incentives forced the government to provide “modernization” by way of telecommunications, entertainment, and advancement in technology. The markets in Egypt were driven to commercialism and as a travel destination because the incentive was one of vacation promotion and tourism instead of real development. As Mankiw stated, “a country’s standard of living depends on its ability to produce goods and services” (Mankiw 2009, 13) and in the case of Egypt, the standard of living never remained high because the economic outcomes were oppressed by the influx of foreign capital without an export or comparative advantage in the globalized market.

Because Egyptian presidents of the past were faced with the choice of economic flow of capital which would ensure their political power to continue, referring specifically to Hosni Mubarak, or having to turn to the mercy of the public and a certain loss of political clout, the reasonable and self interested President thought smartly to continue to accept foreign aid. This is a perfect example of Mankiw’s assertion that “People face tradeoffs” (Mankiw 2009, 2) and that “The cost of something is what you give up to get it” (Mankiw 2009, 4). Both of these points are evident in the Egyptian President’s acceptance of US aid.  In order for Egyptian power to remain in the hands of the President, the US aid had to be accepted in order to pay for the military, to fund public works and in order to appease international relations. The trade off was power over popular support, politics over the notion of responsibility to the public, and the cost of power was abuses of responsibility, economic inferiority, and stagnant growth. On one instance the United States’ used its economic support to Egypt to compel it to join the fight against Iraq in Operation Desert shield. For the cooperation of the Egyptian government in 1990 and throughout the Desert Shield/ Storm wars, the United States forgave Egypt of 6.7 Billion dollars, further exacerbating the reliance of United States dollars (Ebeid 2009, 27)(Sharp 2010, 9-10).

Authoritarian regimes are, as Juan Linz puts it, “Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones” (Linz 2000, 159).  In each of the locations where the Arab Spring had the greatest effects, especially in Egypt, the governments that the people opposed were authoritative and unresponsive to the people that they governed.  The economic capital given to Egyptian elites, both military and political, were the support functions that kept those in power. The United States’ foreign aid strengthened the Egyptian military to the point that it is now the 15th ranked military in the world. That strength is not just recognized in the international forum. Egyptian security forces in the country continue to perpetuate the “State of Emergency” instituted by the Mubarak in order to resume control of the population in the transition period. With the help of U.S. capital, the Egyptian governmental structure was once an authoritarian regime with limited polarization and strong military support, to what is now the Military controlled Authoritarian regime with limited polarization. In situations like these the opinion of polarized and pluralized political parties, allowable only with minor political influence, are forced to resort to secondary means of influence in society, thus come the rise of radical extremist that meet the radical extremes of authoritarian regimes. Taking the U.S. foreign aid into account, the past authority of Egypt’s government as well as the current military actions are in great part allowable only because of the aid. Without the aid of the past Egypt’s military could not be large enough or equipped to police the entire country, nor could they regulate the political arena as they have. Without the aid of the present Egyptian military elites could not operate without the wishes of the people, as they have.

If the United States’ primary mission is to promote democracy in areas of the world that don’t have a true republic or democracy, then the most reasonable outcome would be to cut off foreign aid to Egypt’s government, which is bred for despotism and corruption with military elites guarding that right, protecting their own interests by protecting those of the political elite. The top down approach as has been instituted by the U.S. is currently not feasible to promote positive change in nations nor does it incentivize the just but merely perpetuates or creates more friction. As Claudia Williamson states in The Role of Incentives and Information, “[i]t is almost impossible for the current top-down, central planning like style of foreign aid to overcome both the incentives and information problems….” (Williamson 2009, 16), which supports the argument that current foreign aid policies to Egypt may not be working for that particular goal. However, if the United States goal is to exercise its economic, political, globalized, and cultural hegemony over the Middle East, then the practices that it currently practices is perfect in order to recognize gains in the international affairs of nations. To put it simply, the United States has more incentive to promote authoritarian regimes that can provide it international stability over the promotion of democracy where the United States’ interests may be circumvented by the wishes of a popular majority in a country. The tradeoffs between these two options are easy depending on the goals of the nation in the short term; however the long term effects of economic meddling may produce unintended consequences inside the nations that receive the foreign aid, as well as in the entire international arena. The future of Egyptian politics may give us lessons in how economic aid could be given to a country in order to maximize United State concerns abroad while limiting corruption and dictatorships.

In this essay examples have been given to show how foreign aid from the United States, by way of economic incentive to concede to policy efforts of the U.S., changes the policy and governance of countries. In Egypt, three specific instances stand out above others as events impacted by economic support from the United States. The Camp David Accords show how political power and incentives can be adjusted with promised economic support, promoting the guise of peace by adjusting the tradeoffs for nation. The battles of Desert Storm and Desert Shield show how conflicts can be incited, or at the very least, countries will war with other countries because of economic aid from a powerful aggressor can motivate a rentier state into fighting without a cause.  Finally, the power that the military in Egypt yields is a direct cause of foreign aid to them. This power allows them to maintain political will without the active support of the populations. Foreign aid to Egypt has; disrupted the natural markets, has incentivized rent seeking, has polarized the population, has limited the competitive advantage, and has firmly established authoritarian control over the government without active support to the elites. Based on these outcomes, one can assume that the continued economic support to Egypt concedes the United States’ policy as one of domination over the tradeoff of liberation into democracy. This essays doesn’t concede a moral justification of the events, however this analysis shows that the true internal stability is not present in Egypt because of external influences on the public policy.
References

 

Ebeid, H. (2009). Paying for Peace: America Aid to Egypt, 30 years after Camp David. Washington, D.C.: The Legacy of Camp David: 1979-2009, Middle East Institude. Viewpoints.

 

Gwartney, J.D., Stroup, R.L., Lee, D.R., and Ferrarini, T. H. (2010) Common Sense Economics. New York, NY. St. Martin’s Press.

 

Linz, Juan. (2000). Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Colorado. Lynne Reiner

 

Mankiw, N.G. (2009). Principles of Economics: Sixth Edition. Mason, OH. South Western  Cengage Learning.

 

Ross, M. L. (2001). Does Oil Hinder Democracy. Baltimore, Maryland. Johns Hopkins University

 

Sharp, J. M. (2010) U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2011 Request. Washington D.C. Congressional Research Service.

 

Smith, A. (1976). Wealth of Nations: reprint. Oxford. Clarendon Press.

 

Williamson, C.R. (2009). Exploring the Failure of Foreign Aid: The Role of Incentives and Information. New York. Springer Science and Business Media.

 

 

 

Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), use political Islam and a wealth of “Islamic” rhetoric in order to combat the authoritarian regimes and exercise a means of political autonomy. Specifically in Egypt, a nation with a recent history of authoritarian regimes and oppositional political Islamists, the incentive to organize by the use of Islam is reinforced by the structure that the authoritarian regime constructs. This response of Islam as a tool of political speech is a direct result to both the authority that maintains the status quo, as well as the colonialism that pervaded the Middle East before the setup of the established regime. The purpose of this essay is to synthesize how and through what strategies a group, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, sought to establish political influence under conditions where participation in formal political processes were largely unavailable to them. More specifically, the use of the MB as the specific representative of the Authoritarian versus Islamist dialogue will be stressed to provide the reader with one method that can help Islamists adapt to circumstances of resistance and strive to remain relevant in their society. By analyzing the situation of Egypt’s religiously centered parties, the history, and the manner in which authoritarian regimes structure governance systems, context will be given in order to understand the successes of the Muslim Brotherhood following the 2011 Egyptian Revolutions. Likewise, the role of the Islamist parties, or those parties that utilize Islam in politics, will be more readily understood because the legitimization of their existence and the reason for their rise will be clearly understood. In order to understand the role of Muslim Brotherhood and how it specifically adapted to the political and social environment, the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood and specific mechanics of Egyptian authoritarian regimes in opposition to Islamists in politics need to be analyzed. Additionally, the system that causes the incentive structure for Islamists to organize with the notion of religiosity needs examination.

The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist organization with a structure and history of a political polarization and the intention of bettering their communities through religious unification and moral pronunciation (Rubin 2003, 11). Islamists are those that utilize Islam as a political tool, in order to combat secular rule of many forms, and by-in large, oppose the authoritarian regimes that represent secular dominance and a loss of finer Islamic social policy. The Muslim Brotherhood, as an Islamist organization with a foothold in their social, political, and economic society, is very successful at gaining support from their communities and in recent months, has turned social influence into political support (Blair 2011). As Barry Rubin states in the introduction to his book on the MB, “[t]he Muslim Brotherhood is by far the most successful Islamist group in the world,” a statement that has proven true through a multitude of studies (Rubin 2010, 1). Finally, it will be useful to highlight the modern influences that the movement maintains, as well as its impact to local politics and its potential future effects.

Born in 1928 out of the despise for the western political, economic, and social control of the Middle East, the MB rose as a social group that used Islamic rhetoric as a tool alongside pan-Arabism to promote needed changes in society (Mandaville 2007, 59). As Mahmood Mamdani, author and political scientist, writes in his article titled Inviting Global Violence, “[c] ontemporary, modern political Islam developed as a response to colonialism,” in which he goes on to explain the history and development of fueled aggression to the West (Mamdani 2005, 2). The goal of many of these Islamist groups, thinkers, and reactionaries was to reestablish the political prowess of the Arabs by refocusing the fundamental attention of the minds of the oppressed on the grandeur of Islam and therefore their past. The Muslim Brotherhood stems from this thought, and more profoundly, these thoughts in conjunction with a distrust of secular society to provide a nutrient rich culture for the people coddled by the teachings of Hasan al-Banna. The historical context of the struggle between Egypt’s authoritarian regime and the Islamists can first be seen in the transfer of political autonomy from the colonial powers to the much needed politically justified regime. In Egypt, the balance of power transferred from the Egyptian Monarchs, who were beholden to western domination, to the revolutionaries (Ayubi 1991, 72). Muhammad Naguib was sent over as the President, then, transferred the title over to Gammal Abdel Nasser. With his charisma and strong leadership, Nasser sold a vision of a detached, nationalistic, and socialist Egypt that resonated with a majority of the populous that desired a strong, central, “local” government that could replace a weak puppet of western powers and the old colonialists (Mandaville 2007, 56). Because of this received power and the legitimate role of government function that promised to bring Egypt into modernity with the pledge of a return to Golden Age heights, the political suppression of the MB was accepted by the populous in order to receive the benefits of the globalized world. A process was formulated in which limited political pluralism, called a democracy, was generally accepted until the Arab Uprising in Egypt in 2011. Once the Egyptian government secured its control over the economy and the politics of the land, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups of similar ideals were forced out of the political arena (Ayubi 1991, 60) The voice of a multitude of Islamists remained unheard in public political debates, and those with a voice had to retreat to small communities and mosques in order to vent their grievances. This created an environment of violent reaction due in large to the actions taken by the Egyptian presidents, anger over the inability to react through the political process, and a desire of the MB to motivate the public through Islamic rhetoric (Mandaville 2007, 100).

One method of government control, thus violent reaction, was to deny the Muslim Brotherhood access to the oppositional role in the formal political process through imprisonment, execution, or illegalization of the political activation by the name. These processes played out first with the execution of its leader, Hasan al-Banna, in 1948 and through the outlaw of the MB thereafter as a punishment for the assassination of Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi. This action began a cyclic process of illegalization and limited political liberties. Again in 1954, the MB was outlawed and many of its members were incarcerated until 1964. Many were executed in 1966 and outlawed shortly after. They were finally allowed back into the political sphere in 1984 (Ayubi 1991, 72, 74).

The general distrust of the ruling classes, who were viewed as political proxies and puppets of the western powers after failed occupations, permanently positioned Islamist against the ruling power in their countries, even in the case of Gammal Abdel Nasser who originally favored and respected their position. At this rate, the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups that stemmed from it are marred by the notion of reaction, whereas the power-ready governments set the stage for them to react. The stage of political suppression, and incentives to move for influence in the social fabric of Egyptian society is precisely the primary role that the MB had to adjust to. This adjustment took place through education of religious ideals, communication of grievances in mosques, volunteer work in the name of Islam, and a growth in the promotion of Islam as a tool amongst a segment of the disenfranchised middle class (Ayubi 1991, 82)(Rubin 2010, 13).

            The MB represents a change from secular governments to one based on Islamic (ideological) principles. The history of secular Egypt and the harsh attitudes toward the MB threat forced the MB against the government, which came to be viewed as puppets of globalized economies controlled by the West. For instance, the signature of the Camp David Accord by President Sadat was seen as a distasteful result of the political weakness of secular Egypt (Mandaville 2007, 84). The MB also represent the institution of moral uprightness in place of perceived western debauchery and a blend of secularization and modernization representing the Western colonialist notion of progress. They are in notable opposition to the tight government control of Egypt by former President Mubarak; yet favor economic liberalization comparatively to other Islamists group. The group is fundamental in their ideological striving for Islamic society; however, they do individually disagree with the implementation of such outcomes as what is “properly” Islamic. Although shifting in degrees of violence and radicalization based on the regime or situations it is reacting to, the MB is often a counter-weight to the world it is surrounded by. Oftentimes, it is far removed from its origins as directed by Hasan Al-Banna, but it is more or less a representation of the needs of the people. The anti-colonial stance and the rejection of western ideals that pervades through the ranks of the MB are the tangible traces of Banna’s leadership. As Peter Mandaville states in Global Political Islam that, “…as a social movement, its phenomenal growth through the 1930s and 40s, combined with its founder’s holistic approach, almost ensured that it would take on a more political demeanor” (Mandaville, 2009). Additionally, Ayubi further explains the notion of Islam in politics in his analysis of Islam and secularism in Political Islam. By explaining how Islam is “being a way of life and not simply a religion” (Ayubi, 1991), it is natural to move the dialogue from social spheres into the political realm in order to see lasting effects on a strategic level, which is precisely the root that the MB took after 1939. In the 1970s, the MB appeared in the political arena again during Sadat’s control of the government, and eventually took part in his assassination after a wealth of failed economic and organizational policies (Milton-Edwards 2005, 64).

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was strengthened with the fall of the Egyptian Presidential figurehead, Hosni Mubarak. The Arab Spring saw a rise in the demands of the governed and showed the frailty of authoritarian rule in the Middle East, at least the frailty of the ruling power. Although these words prove true to the date, the Muslim Brotherhood must still work within the confines of strategically powerful military elites. The post-authoritarian Islamist surge was created by the failure of the authoritarian state, and the presence of previous political descent, strengthened by years of social welfare and religious education (Mandaville 2007, 111). The plight of the people both economically and socially was a direct cause of the misrepresentation of the populous that led to the statewide revolt in Egypt, as well as in other communities that the MB has influence. In each of these locations the Islamist, the previous and most well known opposition to the governments, were there to benefit from the rage of the people. In order to understand the successes of the Islamist after the Arab Revolution (Arab Spring), one must understand the nature of adaptability that the Muslim Brotherhood exacts, the social capital given to the MB by the communities, and the political pragmatism of the Muslim Brotherhood (Mandaville 2007, 110).

            The comparative advantage of the MB must be understood by the way of “change” that they represent comparative to the secular model of failure.  Authoritarian regimes are, as Juan Linz puts it:

“Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones” (Linz 2000, 159).

 In each of the locations where the Arab Spring had the most effect, the governments that the people opposed were authoritative and unresponsive to the population that they governed. In situations like these, the opinion of polarized and pluralized political parties allowable only with minor political influence, are forced to resort to secondary means of influence in society.  The Muslim Brotherhood utilized social disenfranchisement to their advantage, providing relief to the people in the communities, and ultimately becoming the standard bearer of social to political action and economic promise. They showed the ability to adapt to the changes in political spheres and were quickly able to tailor their approach to gain public opinion.

The MB adaptability can be seen in its change from pan-Arabism, to violence as a political tool and then toward the Brotherhood’s social welfare and aid programs, and finally in its interaction shift from political activism to political contention. This adaptability is the very core of Islamist methodology, or better put, “mentality” that allows them to adjust to the changing practices of the authoritarian regimes and allows them to respond to the needs of the population. The authoritarian regimes, to the MB, represent the idea of secularization from the west as an import. This idea is central to the idea of Islamic reform essential to the Islamist movement. Ayubi states that “Muslims have not ceased to debate the cultural and political role that Islam should play in confronting, or in adapting to, the challenge of the West,” and continues to show that the Islamist-minded Muslims confront this idea with the notion of Islam as a reformative tool, a return tool, and a way of change (Ayubi 1991, 48).  When the opportunity to rise and the influence of the politics of their country came about with the riots of the masses, the Islamists were readily capable to adjust their organization techniques back to the governance and politics of the nation. This was clearly shown in the three-week turnaround of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, from a social force that provided physical needs to one of force in political will.

Like a multi-purpose tool, the MB and other Islamists were able to use their political opposition history and their social capital, which was shaped over the decades of social integration and community aide, in order to further their cause of political movement. For the last few decades, groups like the MB have been outlawed in countries like Egypt for their political views. The exercising of this authority prevented the MB from gaining political influence in the country, so it turned toward the communities in order to spread Islamic ideals. Through this, and other types of aid and influence, the Islamist groups gained the favor of the people and used their recent help in order to vie for political power. By adapting strategies, again as part of the core of the Islamist methodology, they gained social clout by combining their ideals with the ideals of the communities that they sought to govern and influence, thereby increasing the social stock in the country. At the onset of the fall of the authoritarian regimes, which controlled the monetary and economic systems of the people, it is highly reasonable for the nation to rally around an organization that has been present for quite some time. When understanding incentives as an economic principle, it is clear that providing secondary organizations are more incentivizing than a government that can no longer, or chooses to no longer, provide for the society. The MB brotherhood, and other Islamist parties, have and can potentially provide for the people of the communities, as they have shown through work in the communities before the fall of the authoritarian regimes.

The MB groups represent two very profound differences from the authoritarian governments that will entice the countries. First the Islamist, as the name suggest, represent a more indigenous form of ideological thought and therefore will be more quickly embraced by those in the communities. For instance, as a non-secular, non-western, and moderately principled modern Islamic organization, they will not represent the overtly secular, nor the overtly fundamentalist Islamists. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, if Islamists promoted a moderate and more modern vision from other Islamist groups (Bradley 2012, 55), in comparison to the Salafi political Islamic groups that fared well in Egyptian elections, they would be more readily embraced by those that are in the middle of the political spectrum.  This concept, which is absolutely employed by politically sound Islamist thinkers, allows them to maximize their electorate pool, while still maintaining the moral uprightness that Islam represents.

The second idea is that the MB, and other moderate Islamist, utilized their work as humanitarians, Egyptians, and true bringers of Islamic reform to the people in order to promote the idea of change and difference from the previous authoritarian regime. This concept put them in direct opposition with the secular government that previously failed. Secular governments are viewed as both a failure and puppets to the western powers, and ultimately as bringers of social unrest and national weakness. This gives the Islamist a chance to represent the opposite, however great the pressure is, in order to look like the great saviors of political, economic, and world supremacy standards. Islamists can proclaim that they are the solution, and as the Muslim Brotherhood taut “Islam is the solution” (Mandaville 2007, 99), in order to rally the population under the same decree.

These two suggestions, “Islamism” and the “humanitarian”, are counter stances and therefore opposite to the previous oppressors and their ideals of secularization and liberalization at the expense of the nation, and set the MB up as the great opportunity for Egyptian peoples to return to centuries old successes and influence. The reminder that Islam is the vehicle that will bring prosperity and the use of rhetoric to the course of national history both lead to change in nations like Egypt. This helps change political Islam into a tool for reform and rectification of past failures, with the ability to maintain an ideal of nationalism. The re-characterization of the old regime and the idealized promotion of the opposition put the Islamists of the Middle East and North Africa in a favorable position to govern the people. This gives the Islamists a comparative advantage of secular opposition because they are more distant from the former regime, and therefore make look more viable. Additionally, the comparative advantage is given to more modern and more moderate Islamist groups because it will seem like a better direction of progress to those that want religion instituted and those that do not, but still oppose the old regime.
References

Ayubi, Nazih N. Political Islam. London, UK, Routledge, 1991.

 

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